Abstract. Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We study such games and show that a large class of these games, including games where the individual objectives are mean-or discounted-payoff, or quantitative reachability, and show that they do not only have a solution, but a simple solution. We establish the existence of Nash equilibria that are composed of k memoryless strategies for each agent in a setting with k agents, one main and k − 1 minor strategies. The main strategy describes what happens when all agents comply, whereas the minor strategies ensure that all other agents immediately start to co-operate against the agent who first deviates from the plan. This simplicity is important, as rational agents are an idealisation. Realistically, agents have to decide on their moves with very limited resources, and complicated strategies that require exponential-or even non-elementary-implementations cannot realistically be implemented. The existence of simple strategies that we prove in this paper therefore holds a promise of implementability.
Introduction
The construction of correct and efficient computer systems (both hard-and software) is recognised to be an extremely difficult task. Formal methods have been exploited with some success in the design and verification of such systems. Mathematical logic, automata theory [17] , and model-checking [12] have contributed much to the success of formal methods in this field. However, traditional approaches aim at systems with qualitative specifications like LTL, and rely on the fact that these specifications are either satisfied or violated by the system. Unfortunately, these techniques do not trivially extend to complex systems, such as embedded or distributed systems. A main reason for this is that such systems often consist of multiple independent components with individual objectives. These components can be viewed as selfish agents that may cooperate and compete at the same time. It is difficult to model the interplay between these components with traditional finite state machines, as they cannot reflect the intricate quantitative valuation of an agent on how well he has met his goal. In particular, it is not realistic to assume that these components are always cooperating to satisfy a common goal, as it is, e.g., assumed in works that distinguish between an environment and a system. We argue that it is more realistic to assume that all components act like selfish agents that try to achieve their own objectives and are either unconcerned about the effect this has on the other components or consider this effect to be secondary. It is indeed a recent trend to enhance the system models used in the classical approach of verification by quantitative cost and gain functions, and to exploit the well established game-theoretic framework [21, 22] for their formal analysis.
The first steps towards the extension of computational models with concepts from classical game theory were taken by advancing from boolean to general two-player zero-sum games played on graphs [15] . Like their qualitative counter parts, those games are adequate to model controller-environment interaction problems [24, 25] . As usual in control theory, one can distinguish between moves of a control player, who plays actions to control a system to meet a control objective, and an antagonistic environment player. In the classical setting, the control player has a qualitative objective-he might, for example, try to enforce a temporal specification-whereas the environment tries to prevent this. In the extension to quantitative games, the controller instead tries to maximise its gain, while the environment tries to minimise it. This extension lifts the controller synthesis problem from a constructive extension of a decision problem to a classical optimisation problem.
However, this extension has not lifted the restriction to purely antagonist interactions between a controller and a hostile environment. In order to study more complex systems with more than two components, and with objectives that are not necessarily antagonist, we resort to multiplayer non zero-sum games. In this context, Nash equilibria [21] take the place that winning and optimal strategies take in qualitative and quantitative two-player games zero-sum games, respectively. Surprisingly, qualitative objectives have so far prevailed in the study of Nash equilibria for distributed systems. However, we argue that Nash equilibria for selfish agents with quantitative objectives-such as reaching a set of target states quickly or with a minimal consumption of energy-are natural objectives that aught to be studied alongside (or instead of) traditional qualitative objectives.
Consequently, we study Nash equilibria for multiplayer non zero-sum games played on graphs with quantitative objectives.
Our contribution. In this paper, we study turn-based multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with quantitative objectives, expressed through a cost function for each player (cost games). Each cost function assigns, for every play of the game, a value that represents the cost that is incurred for a player by this play. Cost functions allow to express classical quantitative objectives such as quantitative reachability (i.e., the player aims at reaching a subset of states as soon as possible), or mean-payoff objectives. In this framework, all players are supposed to be rational: they want to minimise their own cost or, equivalently, maximise their own gain. This invites the use of Nash equilibria as the adequate concept for cost games.
Our results are twofold. Firstly, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria for a large class of cost games that includes quantitative reachability and mean-payoff objectives. Secondly, we study the complexity of these Nash equilibria in terms of the memory needed in the strategies of the individual players in these Nash equilibria. More precisely, we ensure existence of Nash equilibria whose strategies only requires a number of memory states that is linear in the size of the game for a wide class of cost games, including games with quantitative reachability and mean-payoff objectives.
The general philosophy of our work is as follows: we try to derive existence of Nash equilibria in multiplayer non zero-sum quantitative games (and characterization of their complexity) through determinacy results (and characterization of the optimal strategies) of several well-chosen two-player quantitative games derived from the multiplayer game. These ideas were already successfully exploited in the qualitative framework [16] , and in the case of limit-average objectives [26] .
Related work. Several recent papers have considered two-player zero-sum games played on finite graphs with regular objectives enriched by some quantitative aspects. Let us mention some of them: games with finitary objectives [10] , mean-payoff parity games [11] , games with prioritised requirements [1] , request-response games where the waiting times between the requests and the responses are minimized [18, 28] , games whose winning conditions are expressed via quantitative languages [2] , and recently, cost-parity and cost-Streett games [13] .
Other work concerns qualitative non zero-sum games. In [16] , general criteria ensuring existence of Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria (resp. secure equilibria) are provided for multiplayer (resp. 2-player) games, as well as complexity results. The complexity of Nash equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with Büchi objectives has been discussed in [5] . [4] studies the existence of Nash equilibria for timed games with qualitative reachability objectives Finally, there is a series of recent results on the combination of non zero-sum aspects with quantitative objectives. In [3] , the authors study games played on graphs with terminal vertices where quantitative payoffs are assigned to the players. In [19] , the authors provide an algorithm to decide the existence of Nash equilibria for concurrent priced games with quantitative reachability objectives. In [23] , the authors prove existence of a Nash equilibrium in Muller games on finite graphs where players have a preference ordering on the sets of the Muller table. Let us also notice that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in cost games with quantitative reachability objectives we study in this paper has already been established in [7] . The new proves we provide are simpler and significantly improve the complexity of the strategies constructed from exponential to linear in the size of the game.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we present the model of multiplayer cost games and define the problems we study. The main results are given in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4, we apply our general result on particular cost games with classical objectives. Omitted proofs and additional materials can be found in the Appendix.
• Π is a finite set of players, Cost games are multiplayer turn-based quantitative non zero-sum games. We assume that the players are rational: they play in a way to minimise their own cost. Note that minimising cost or maximising gain are essentially 3 equivalent, as maximising the gain for player i can be modelled by using Cost i to be minus this gain and then minimising the cost. This is particularly important in cases where two players have antagonistic goals, as it is the case in all two-player zero-sum games. To cover these cases without changing the setting, we sometimes refer to maximisation in order to preserve the connection to such games in the literature.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each vertex has at least one outgoing edge. Moreover, it is sometimes convenient to specify an initial vertex v 0 ∈ V of the game. We then call the pair (G, v 0 ) an initialised multiplayer cost game. This game is played as follows. First, a token is placed on the initial vertex v 0 . Whenever a token is on a vertex v ∈ V i controlled by player i, player i chooses one of the outgoing edges (v, v ′ ) ∈ E and moves the token along this edge to v ′ . This way, the players together determine an infinite path through the graph G, which we call a play. Let us remind that Plays is the set of all plays in G.
A history h of G is a finite path through the graph G. We denote by Hist the set of histories of a game, and by ǫ the empty history. In the sequel, we write h = h 0 . . . h k , where h 0 , . . . , h k ∈ V (k ∈ N), for a history h, and similarly, ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 . . ., where ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . ∈ V , for a play ρ. A prefix of length n + 1 (for some n ∈ N) of a play ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 . . . is the finite history ρ 0 . . . ρ n . We denote this history by ρ[0, n].
Given a history h = h 0 . . . h k and a vertex v such that (h k , v) ∈ E, we denote by hv the history h 0 . . . h k v. Moreover, given a history h = h 0 . . . h k and a play ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 . . . such that (h k , ρ 0 ) ∈ E, we denote by hρ the play h 0 . . . h k ρ 0 ρ 1 . . ..
The function Last (resp. First) returns, for a given history h = h 0 . . . h k , the last vertex h k (resp. the first vertex h 0 ) of h. The function First naturally extends to plays.
A strategy of player i in G is a function σ : Hist → V assigning to each history h ∈ Hist that ends in a vertex
A strategy profile of G is a tuple (σ i ) i∈Π of strategies, where σ i refers to a strategy for player i. Given an initial vertex v, a strategy profile determines the unique play of (G, v) that is consistent with all strategies σ i . This play is called the outcome of (σ i ) i∈Π and denoted by (σ i ) i∈Π v . We say that a player deviates from a strategy (resp. from a play) if he does not carefully follow this strategy (resp. this play).
A finite strategy automaton for player i ∈ Π over a game
-M is a non-empty, finite set of memory states, -m 0 ∈ M is the initial memory state,
We can extend the memory update function δ to a function δ
for all m ∈ M and hv ∈ Hist. The strategy σ Ai computed by a finite strategy automaton A i is defined by σ Ai (hv) = ν(δ * (m 0 , h), v) for all hv ∈ Hist such that v ∈ V i . We say that σ is a finite-memory strategy if there exists 4 a finite strategy automaton A such that σ = σ A . Moreover, we say that σ = σ A has a memory of size at most |M |, where |M | is the number of states of A. In particular, if |M | = 1, we say that σ is a positional strategy (the current vertex of the play determines the choice of the next vertex). We call (σ i ) i∈Π a strategy profile with memory m if for all i ∈ Π, the strategy σ i has a memory of size at most m. A strategy profile (σ i ) i∈Π is called positional or finite-memory if each σ i is a positional or a finite-memory strategy, respectively.
We now define the notion of Nash equilibria in this quantitative framework.
Definition 2. Given an initialised multiplayer cost game
for every player j ∈ Π and for every strategy σ ′ j of player j, we have:
This definition means that, for all j ∈ Π, player j has no incentive to deviate from σ j since he cannot strictly decrease his cost when using σ ′ j instead of σ j . Keeping notations of Definition 2 in mind, a strategy σ
2 ) be the two-player cost game whose graph G = (V, E) is depicted in Figure 1 . The states of player 1 (resp. 2) are represented by circles (resp. squares) 5 . Thus, according to Figure 1 , V 1 = {A, C, D} and V 2 = {B}. In order to define the cost functions of both players, we consider a price function π : E → {1, 2, 3}, which assigns a price to each edge of the graph. The price function 6 π is as follows (see the numbers in Figure 1 
As for the cost function Cost 2 of player 2, it expresses a mean-payoff objective: the cost of a play is the long-run average of the prices that appear along this play. Formally, for any play ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 . . . of G:
Each player aims at minimising the cost incurred by the play. Let us insist on the fact that the players of a cost game may have different kinds of cost functions (as in this example). An example of a play in G can be given by ρ = (AB) ω , leading to the costs Cost 1 (ρ) = +∞ and Cost 2 (ρ) = 1. In the same way, the play ρ ′ = A(BC) ω induces the following costs: Cost 1 (ρ) = 2 and Cost 2 (ρ) = 2.
Let us fix the initial vertex v 0 at the vertex A. The play ρ = (AB) ω is the outcome of the positional strategy 7 profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) where σ 1 (A) = B and σ 2 (B) = A. Moreover, this strategy profile is in fact a Nash equilibrium: player 2 gets the least cost he can expect in this game, and player 1 has no incentive to choose the edge (A, D) (it does not allow the play to pass through vertex C).
We now consider the positional strategy profile (σ
Its outcome is the play ρ ′ = A(BC) ω . However, this strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium, because player 2 can strictly lower his cost by always choosing the edge (B, A) instead of (B, C), thus lowering his cost from 2 to 1. In other words, the strategy σ 2 (defined before) is a profitable deviation for player 2 w.r.t. (σ
The questions studied in this paper are the following ones:
Problem 1 Given a multiplayer cost game G, does there exist a Nash equilibrium in G?

Problem 2 Given a multiplayer cost game G, does there exist a finite-memory Nash equilibrium in G?
Obviously enough, if we make no restrictions on our cost games, the answer to Problem 1 (and thus to Problem 2) is negative (see Example 4). Our first goal in this paper is to identify a large class of cost games for which the answer to Problem 1 is positive. Then we also positively reply to Problem 2 for subclasses of the previously identified class of cost games. Both results can be found in Section 3. (G, A) be the initialised one-player cost game depicted below, whose cost function Cost 1 is defined by Cost 1 (A n B ω ) = 1 n for n ∈ N 0 and Cost 1 (A ω ) = +∞. One can be convinced that there is no Nash equilibrium in this initialised game.
Example 4. Let
A B
In order to our class of cost games, we need the notions of Min-Max cost games, determinacy and optimal strategies. The following two definitions are inspired by [27] .
Definition 5. A Min-Max cost game is a tuple
, where In such a game, player Min wants to minimise his cost, while player Max wants to maximise his gain. So, a Min-Max cost game is a particular case of a two-player cost game. Let us stress that, according to this definition, a Min-Max cost game is zero-sum if Cost Min = Gain Max , but this might not always be the case 8 . We also point out that Definition 5 allows to take completely unrelated functions Cost Min and Gain Max , but usually they are similar (see Definition 15) . In the sequel, we denote by Σ Min (resp. Σ Max ) the set of strategies of player Min (resp. Max) in a Min-Max cost game.
) is a finite directed graph with vertices V and edges
E ⊆ V × V , • (V Min , V Max ) is a partition of V such that V Min (resp. V Max )
Definition 6. Given a Min-Max cost game G, we define for every vertex v ∈ V the upper value Val
* (v) as:
and the lower value Val * (v) as:
The game G is determined if, for every v ∈ V , we have Val * (v) = Val * (v). In this case, we say that the game G has a value, and for every v ∈ V , Val(v) = Val * (v) = Now we show that the strategy profile (τ i ) i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium in G. As a contradiction, let us assume that there exists a profitable deviation τ ′ j for some player j ∈ Π. We denote by ρ ′ := τ ′ j , (τ i ) i∈Π\{j} v0 the outcome where player j plays according to his profitable deviation τ ′ j and the players of the coalition Π \ {j} keep their strategies (τ i ) i∈Π\{j} . Since τ ′ j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τ i ) i∈Π , we have that:
As both plays ρ and ρ ′ start from vertex v 0 , there exists a history hv ∈ Hist such that ρ = h (τ i ) i∈Π v and ρ ′ = h τ ′ j , (τ i ) i∈Π\{j} v (remark that h could be empty). Among the common prefixes of ρ and ρ ′ , we choose the history hv of maximal length. By definition of the strategy profile (τ i ) i∈Π , we can write in the case of the outcome ρ that ρ = h (σ ⋆ i ) i∈Π v . Whereas in the case of the outcome ρ ′ , player j does not follow his strategy σ ⋆ j any more from vertex v, and so, the coalition Π \ {j} punishes him by playing according to the strategy σ ⋆ −j after history hv, and so Figure 2) . Since σ ⋆ −j is an optimal strategy for the coalition Π \ {j} in the determined MinMax cost game G j , we have:
The last inequality comes from the hypothesis Cost j ≥ Gain j Max in the game G j . Moreover, the game G is cost-prefix-linear, and then, when considering the history hv, there exist a ∈ R and b ∈ R + such that The proofs of these two theorems rely on the construction of the Nash equilibrium provided in the proof of Theorem 10.
Applications
In this section, we exhibit several classes of classical objectives that can be encoded in our general setting. The list we propose is far from being exhaustive.
Qualitative Objectives
Multiplayer games with qualitative (win/lose) objectives can naturally be encoded via multiplayer cost games; for instance via cost functions Cost i : Plays → {1, +∞}, where 1 (resp. +∞) means that the play is won (resp. lost) by player i. Let us now consider the subclass of qualitative games with prefix-independent 9 Borel objectives. Given such a game G, we have that G is coalition-determined, as a consequence of the Borel determinacy theorem [20] . Moreover the prefix-independence hypothesis obviously guarantees that G is also cost-prefix-linear (by taking a = 0 and b = 1). By applying Theorem 10, we obtain the existence of a Nash equilibrium for qualitative games with prefix-independent Borel objectives. Let us notice that this result is already present in [16] .
When considering more specific subclasses of qualitative games enjoying a positional determinacy result, such as parity games [15] , we can apply Theorem 13 and ensure existence of a Nash equilibrium whose memory is (at most) linear.
Classical Quantitative Objectives
We here give four well-known kinds of Min-Max cost games and see later that they are determined. For each sort of game, the cost and gain functions are defined from a price function (and a reward function in the last case), which labels the edges of the game graph with prices (and rewards).
Definition 15 ([27]). Given a game graph
, a price function π : E → R that assigns a price to each edge, a diverging 10 reward function ϑ : E → R that assigns a reward to each edge, and a play ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 . . . in G, we define the following Min-Max cost games: 9 An objective Ω ⊆ V ω is prefix-independent if only if for every play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ V ω , we have that ρ ∈ Ω iff for every n ∈ N, ρnρn+1 . . . ∈ Ω. 10 For all plays ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . in G, it holds that limn→∞ | n i=1 ϑ(ρi−1, ρi)| = +∞. This is equivalent to requiring that every cycle has a positive sum of rewards.
(i) a reachability-price game is a Min-Max cost game G = (G, RP Min , RP Max ) together with a given goal set Goal ⊆ V , where
together with a given discount factor λ ∈ ]0, 1[, where 
An average-price game is then a particular case of a price-per-reward-average game. Let us remark that, in Example 3, the cost function Cost 1 (resp. Cost 2 ) corresponds to RP Min with Goal = {C} (resp. AP Min ). The game G 1 (resp. G 2 ) of Example 9 is a reachability-price (resp. average-price) game.
The following theorem is a well-known result about the particular cost games described in Definition 15.
Theorem 16 ([27,14]). Reachability-price games, discounted-price games, averageprice games, and price-per-reward games are determined and have positional optimal strategies.
This result implies that a multiplayer cost game where each cost function is RP Min , DP Min , AP Min or PRAvg Min is positionally coalition-determined. Moreover, one can show that such a game is cost-prefix-linear. Theorem 17 then follows from Theorem 13. Note that the existence of finite-memory Nash equilibria in cost games with quantitative reachability objectives has already been established in [7, 8] . Even if not explicitly stated in the previous papers, one can deduce from the proof of [8, Lemma 16] that the provided Nash equilibrium has a memory (at least) exponential in the size of the cost game. Thus, Theorem 17 significantly improves the complexity of the strategies constructed in the case of cost games with quantitative reachability objectives.
Theorem 17. In every initialised multiplayer cost game
G = (Π, V, (V i ) i∈Π , E, (Cost i ) i∈Π )
Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Objectives
Multiplayer cost games allow to encode games combining both qualitative and quantitative objectives, such as mean-payoff parity games [11] . In our framework, where each player aims at minimising his cost, the mean-payoff parity objective could be encoded as follows: Cost i (ρ) = AP Min (ρ) if the parity condition is satisfied, +∞ otherwise.
The determinacy of mean-payoff parity games, together with the existence of optimal strategies (that could require infinite memory) have been proved in [11] . This result implies that multiplayer cost games with mean-payoff parity objectives are coalitiondetermined. Moreover, one can prove that such a game is also cost-prefix-linear (by taking a = 0 and b = 1). By applying Theorem 10, we obtain the existence of a Nash equilibrium for multiplayer cost games with mean-payoff parity objectives. As far as we know, this is the first result about the existence of a Nash equilibrium in cost games with mean-payoff parity games.
Remark 18. Let us emphasise that Theorem 10 applies to cost games where the players have different kinds of cost functions (as in Example 3). In particular, one player could have a qualitative Büchi objective, a second player a discounted-price objective, a third player a mean-payoff parity objective,. . .
Technical Appendix
A Example of a cost game which is not cost-prefix-linear Example 19 . Multiplayer cost games allow to encode energy games. Let G be a cost game defined by means of a price function π : E → R, that assigns a price to each edge. In our framework, where each player aims at minimising his cost, an energy objective [6] (with threshold T ∈ R) could be encoded as follows:
Fig. 3. A cost game which is not cost-prefix-linear
Let us consider the one-player cost game with an energy objective (with threshold T = 2) depicted in Figure 3 . We show that this game is not cost-prefix-linear. For this, we exhibit a history hv ∈ Hist such that for all a, b ∈ R there exists a play ρ ∈ Plays with First(ρ) = v, such that Cost 1 (hρ) = a + b · Cost 1 (ρ). We in fact give a play ρ independent of a and b. Let hv be the history AAABA and ρ be the play (AB) ω . We have that Cost 1 (ρ) = 1 and Cost 1 (hρ) = Cost 1 (AA(AB) ω ) = +∞, since sup n≥0 π((hρ)[0, n]) = 3, which is above the threshold T = 2. It is thus impossible to find a, b ∈ R such that:
B Remark about secure and subgame perfect equilibria Remark 20 . It would be tempting to try to prove the existence of subgame perfect equilibria or secure equilibria 12 in multiplayer cost games with techniques similar to the proof of Theorem 10. However, our definition of the Nash equilibrium in the proof of Theorem 10 is (in general) neither a subgame perfect equilibrium, nor a secure equilibrium. To see this, let us consider the following two cost games G and H, whose graphs are depicted on Figure 4 and 5 respectively. Both games are initialised in vertex A.
The game G is a two-player cost game where the vertices of player 1 (resp. 2) are represented by circles (resp. squares), that is, V 1 = {B, C, D, E, F } and V 2 = {A}. The cost functions of both players are RP Min , with 13 Goal 1 = Goal 2 = {D, E} and the price function π : E → R defined by π(e) = 1 for any edge e ∈ E (same price function for the two players). It means that both players have reachability objectives and want to reach vertex D or E within the least number of edges.
Let us study the two Min-Max cost games G 1 and G 2 . In the game G 1 , let σ ⋆ −j in G j ) for j ∈ Π \ {i}. As the game G is now positionally coalition-determined by hypothesis, these strategies are assumed to be positional. This proof consists in showing that (τ i ) i∈Π is a strategy profile with memory (at most) |V | + |Π|.
For this purpose, we define a finite strategy automaton for each player that remembers the play ρ and who has to be punished. As the play ρ is the outcome of the positional strategy profile (σ As we want to be sure that the play ρ is followed by all players, we need to memorise which movement (edge) has to be chosen at each step of ρ. This is the role of {v 0 v 0 , v 0 v 1 , . . . , v n−1 v n , v n v k }. But in case a player deviates from ρ, we only have to remember this player during the rest of the play (no matter if another player later deviates from ρ). This is the role of Π \ {i}. -m 0 = v 0 v 0 (this memory state means that the play has not begun yet). if m = j ∈ Π or (m = u 1 u 2 , with u 1 , u 2 ∈ V , v = u 2 and u 1 ∈ V j ), v l v l+1 if m = uv l for a certain l ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, u ∈ V , and v = v l , v n v k otherwise (m = uv n and v = v n ).
Intuitively, m represents either a player to punish, or the edge that should, if following ρ, have been chosen at the last step of the current stage of the play, and v is the real last vertex of the current stage of the play. Notice that in this definition of δ, j is different from i because if player i follows the strategy computed by this strategy automaton, one can be convinced that he does not deviate from the play ρ.
-ν : M × V i → V is defined in this way: given m ∈ M and v ∈ V i ,
